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The Declaratory Judgment Act's
Actual Controversy Requirement:
Should a Patent Owner's Promise Not to Sue
Deprive the Court of Jurisdiction?
Super SackManufacturing Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp.'
I. INTRODUCTON
The Declaratory Judgment Act1 enables a party who will be injured by the
enforcement of a law to obtain a federal court adjudication of his rights and
responsibilities under the law. The Act incorporated the constitutional
requirement that an "actual controversy" exist between the plaintiff and
defendant; the mere possibility ofa dispute is insufficient? Determining whether
an "actual controversy" is present, however, is often difficult, especially in
patent law.
The Act is a powerful tool in determining the rights of patent owners vis-a-
vis parties threatened by an infringement action. The Act can be used by an
accused infringer to request that a court review whether the patent was correctly
issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office. The Super Sack court
was faced with the narrow issue of whether the district court should have
retained jurisdiction where the patent owner promised not to sue the accused
infringer. The court held that the promise not to sue ended the controversy and
therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment
action. Although the court's holding was correct, the court failed to harmonize
its holding with persuasive authority holding that courts may retain jurisdiction
under similar circumstances. An analysis of those authorities reveals that the
rule established by this court may inappropriately favor patent owners in future
cases presenting different facts.
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
In August 1988, Super Sack Manufacturing Corporation (Super Sack) sued
Chase Packaging Corporation (Chase) for infringement of two patents, U.S.
Patent Numbers 4,143,796 and 4,194,652 (collectively, the patents-in-suit)
Chase denied infringement and counterclaimed for declaratory judgments that
there was no infringement and that the patents were invalid due to anticipation
1. 57 F.3d 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 815 (1996).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994).
3. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
4. Super Sack, 57 F.3d at 1055.
1
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and obviousness The parties completed discovery, submitted a joint pretrial
order to the trial court, and, in May 1989, Chase made a motion for summary
judgment of noninfringement.6
Super Sack was pursuing other litigation on the same two patents
concurrently. In 1990, Super Sack asserted the patents against a second party,
Augusta Bag CompanyZ In a bench trial in the Southern District of Georgia, the
trial court found the patents-in-suit to be "not invalid," but not infringed.8
Meanwhile, in the present case, the trial court denied the motion for
sumnmaryjudgment in August 1991. Thereafter, the suit sat idle until February
1993, when Chase again moved for summary judgment of noninfringement,
invalidity, and inequitable conduct." The trial court did not rule on the summary
judgment motion." Instead, in May 1994, the trial court directed the parties to
confer to determine whether the case should proceed to trial in light of new
circumstances.1 The new circumstances were that Super Sack appeared willing
to drop its infringement claim against Chase, and that Chase, in turn, appeared
willing to drop the inequitable conduct claim. 3 Chase responded to the directive
5. Id To prove anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994), one must demonstrate,
among other things, identity of invention. ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE
FEDERAL CiRcurr 59 (3d ed. 1994). "Anticipation" requires that each and every element
of the claimed invention (the subject of the patent) be disclosed in a single prior art
reference or embodied in a single prior art device or practice. Id at 57. Thus, an
invention is anticipated if there is no difference between the claimed invention and the
prior art reference, as viewed by a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention.
Id
Obviousness is defined under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994) which states:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed
or described as set forth in section 102... if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains.
6. Super Sack, 57 F.3d at 1055-56.
7. Id at 1055.
8. Id The decision was summarily affirmed by the Federal Circuit in September
1993. See Super Sack Mfg. v. Augusta Bag Co., 6 F.3d 786 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
9. Super Sack, 57 F.3d at 1055-56.
10. Id Super Sack first responded to all three issues in the summary judgment
motion, but later argued that the inequitable conduct claim had not been pled and that the
court therefore lacked jurisdiction. Id. Chase argued that Super Sack waived the
procedural objection by answering on the merits and that Super Sack was not prejudiced
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from the court with a report stating that it was unwilling to drop its declaratory
judgment counterclaims, and further responded with motions to amend its
pleadings to include the inequitable conduct claim and for summary judgment
on the issue of noninfringement. 14
Super Sack answered Chase's motion with a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 41(a)(2). 5
Super Sack's motion stated that it would "unconditionally agree not to sue Chase
for infringement as to any claim of the patents-in-suit based upon the products
currently manufactured and sold by Chase."' 6 Super Sack argued that this
statement removed any current or future apprehension by Chase that it would
face claims of infringement, rendered all other issues moot, and thus eliminated
any actual case or controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction.' 7 Without
an actual case or controversy, the court was divested ofjurisdiction.18 Before
finding for Super Sack, the court noted explicitly that the promise not to sue
extended only to products that Chase made, used, or sold on or before the date
Super Sack filed its motion to dismiss. 9 Super Sack refused to concede its
claims of infringement against Chase, but unconditionally promised not to sue
Chase for infringement of the patents-in-suit with respect to any products
currently manufactured or sold by Chase.20
The trial court granted Super Sack's motion and dismissed the case with
prejudice, based on Super Sack's unwillingness to pursue its claims and its
unconditional promise not to sue on the patents-in-suit2 The court found that
Chase failed to show a continuing case or controversy and, in the interest of
judicial economy, denied Chase's motion to amend its pleadings.22
Chase appealed the dismissal to the Federal Circuit, arguing that Super
Sack's promise not to sue existed only in motion papers and a trial court order,
not a covenant, so that the promise was too indefinite to estop Super Sack from
again suing Chase on the patents-in-suit as to past and present products? 3
Additionally, Chase argued that the promise was defective because it failed to
cover future products at all.24 Chase thus argued that the promise by Super Sack





19. Super Sack, 57 F.3d at 1056.




24. Super Sack, 57 F.3d at 1057.
1997]
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was not sufficiently concrete to protect it from future suit or to deny the trial
court of jurisdiction
The Federal Circuit panel affirmed the trial court's order denying Chase's
motion to amend its pleadings and granted Super Sack's motion to dismiss with
prejudice for lack ofjurisdiction.? The court held that where a putative infringer
seeks a declaratory judgment of the invalidity of a patent, and the patent owner
subsequently promises not to assert the patent-in-suit against the putative
infringer for products the infringer has made, used, or sold, there ceases to be a
justiciable controversy and the trial court must dismiss.?
m. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Declaratory Judgment Acf9 is the procedural tool used to determine
whether the patent-in-suit complies with patentability requirements. The Act
allows ajudicial check to ensure that the Patent and Trademark Office correctly
granted patent protection. However, this judicial check cannot occur without an
actual controversy involving the patent.? To be sure, the Act restates the
constitutional requirement that there be an actual controversy between the
parties °
While the federal courts are forbidden from issuing advisory opinions on
abstract questions, in practice the difference between an abstract question and an
25. Id at 1057-58.
26. Id at 1060.
27. Id. at 1059-60.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994).
29. Note also that even where there is an actual controversy, the exercise of
declaratory judgment jurisdiction is not an absolute right of a litigant, but rather a
discretionary act ofthe trial court. 5 CHISUM, PATENTS § 21.02[1] (1993) (citing Brillhart
v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491 (1942)).
30. Section 2201 begins with a reference to "a case of actual controversy within
its jurisdiction." 5 CHIsUM, supra note 29. See also Note, Patent Law-Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act Requirement of Actual Controversy Satisfied in Alleged
Infringer's Suit Notwithstanding Withdrawal ofInfringement Charge, 5 HOw. L.J. 142
(1959). The Supreme Court spoke to the requirement of a controversy:
The Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, in its limitation to 'cases of actual
controversy,' manifestly has regard to the constitutional provision and is
operative only in respect to controversies which are such in the constitutional
sense.... In providing remedies and defining procedure in relation to cases
and controversies in the constitutional sense the Congress is acting within its
delegated power over jurisdiction of the federal courts which the Congress is
authorized to establish.
Id at n.9 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937)).
4
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actual controversy is "necessarily one of degree" 31 The line is thin because,
unlike the normal suit brought by an injured plaintiff, the declaratory judgment
plaintiff has not yet suffered any actual harm. Thus, it is difficult simply to
apply a precise test and determine whether there is ajusticiable controversy.3 2
In the patent arena, however, the courts have formulated a two-prong test to
determine if a case satisfies the actual controversy requirement?3 First, there
must be an actual or implicit charge of infringement so that the party bringing
the declaratory action (complainant) is placed under a reasonable apprehension
that the patent owner would initiate suit if the complainant continued the
allegedly infringing activity.34 Second, the complainant must have either
produced the device or prepared to produce the device?
A. The Relevant Caselaw
In Spectronics Corp. v. H.B. Fuller Co., the court examined a dismissal of
a declaratory judgment claim where the patent owner filed a covenant not to
assert its patent and filed a reissue application with the Patent and Trademark
31. 5 CHIsUM, supra note 29, § 21.02[l][iii] (quoting Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific
Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270,273 (1941)).
32. 5 CHIsUM, supra note 29, § 21.02[1][iii].
33. 5 CHMSUM, supra note 29, § 21.02[1][iii].
34. 5 CmsUM, supra note 29, § 21.02[1][iii], n.70.1, 71 (citing among others West
Interactive Corp. v. First Data Resources, Inc., 972 F.2d 1295, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 1992), and
Arrowhead Industrial Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
("The test... is objective and is applied to the facts existing when the complaint is
filed .... Its first prong looks to [patent owner's] conduct; its second to that of
[complainant] .... Respecting [patent owner's] conduct, it must be such as to indicate
[patent owner's] intent to enforce its patent .... Respecting [complainant's] conduct,
it must be such as to establish that [complainant] has a true interest to be protected by the
declaratory judgment.")).
35. Id. Also, the Federal Circuit has stated that the "existence of a case or
controversy is evaluated on a claim-by-claim basis in patent infringement litigation."
HARMON, supra note 5 at 289 (citing Jervis B. Webb Co. v. Southern Sys., Inc., 742 F.2d
1388 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). Therefore, a claim of infringement as to one claim of a patent
does not automatically confer jurisdiction upon the court to decide a counterclaim
seeking a finding of invalidity of all claims of the patent. Id However, an accused
infringer may challenge the validity of all claims in response to general accusations of
infringement, and a court may find all claims invalid when the evidence at trial
establishes a generalized basis such as fraud or derivation. Id
In Stearns, the court held that where an infringement complaint is amended prior
to trial in order to remove several claims from the suit, it is error to hold the entire patent
invalid in the absence of a declaratory judgment counterclaim. Ie (citing Steams v.
Beckman Instr., Inc., 737 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
19971
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Office subsequent to the filing of the suit3 6 The court first disposed of the
claimant's argument that declaratory judgment jurisdiction must be determined
solely on the facts as they existed at the time the complaint was filed?7
Although there is a rule that "the presence or absence of jurisdiction must be
determined on the facts'existing at the time the complaint... was filed,"38 that
rule does not conclude the inquiry because Article III of the United States
Constitution requires a live controversy at the time a federal court decides a
case.39 Indeed, the court stressed that the Supreme Court requires that "[a]n
actual controversy... be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the
complaint is filed."4 0 Thus, the district court properly considered post-filing
events pursuant to its continuing jurisdiction, and the court found that post-filing
events did in fact render the controversy moot4
The claimant, Spectronics Corporation (Spectronics), conceded that the
covenant effectively estopped the patent owner from asserting the old patent
against Spectronics, but claimed that the potential grant of a reissue patent
manifestly placed it at risk of further litigation on the same subject as the old
patent.42 Spectronics referred to a letter from the patent owner reiterating that the
patent owner still could sue for infringement of new claims that might emerge
from the reissued patent.43 The court found that the prospect of a reissued patent
actually issuing and then being asserted against Spectronics was too speculative
as a basis forjurisdiction.= " In essence, Spectronics was requesting that the court
36. Spectronics Corp. v. H.B. Fuller Co., 940 F.2d 631,633 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The
defendant patent owner filed the covenant entitled, "Statement of Non Liability," with
the court. The covenant stated that the claimant Spectronics had no liability for
infringement of the claims of the patent-in-issue, nor would the patent owner or any
successors-in-interest sue Spectronics. It also stated that the patent owner had filed a
reissue application to reissue the patent (to cancel the patent's claims and seek new
claims), but did not mention whether Spectronics would be liable for infringement of the
reissued patent. Id.
37. Id. at 634.
38. Id at 635 (quoting Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d
731, 734 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
39. Id (quoting Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 823 F.2d 1538, 1549 (Fed. Cir.
1987)).
40. Id (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975)).
41. Id at 636.
42. Id As a general matter, reissue is allowed under 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1994) to
allow for the correction of error in an issued patent. "The purpose of reissue, as far as
claims are concerned, is to permit limitations to be added to claims that are too broad or
to be taken from claims that are too narrow." HARMON, supra note 5, § 15.3(a) (citing
In re Weiler, 790 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
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issue a declaration of the validity of claims that did not yet exist.45 Furthermore,
the terms of the covenant of non-liability assured that if identical claims did
issue, Spectronics could not be held liable. Thus, while Spectronics might have
had some cause to fear a suit for future infringement of substantively non-
identical claims after reissue, it had no such case with regard to claims of the
original patentl
However, on more compelling facts, several courts have found jurisdiction
to decide patent validity where the patent owners have agreed not to pursue
claims of infringement against the declaratory judgment claimant!'
In Blackman v. Hadron, Inc., the parties reached a settlement requiring that
all past infringements be forgiven against two customers of Hadron Incorporated
(Hadron), the maker of an alleged infringing product, who had used an apparatus
sold by Hadron alleged to infringe the patent in the suit.49 A formal confession
of non-infringement was filed, releasing Hadron from all past infringementsO
The only claim remaining against Hadron was for contributory infringement of
a method patent, but since there were no other users of the product, no charge of
direct infringement existed5 1 Without direct infringement, no action for
contributory infringement can be maintained52
Despite the lack of a charge of direct infringement, the court held that a real
controversy existed.' First, the court found a problem with the lack of a
"determination ofnon-infringement."'' The patent owner only agreed to forgive
past infringement and to terminate the action against the direct infringer.5s
45. Id.
46. Id. The court determined this result would be required by 35 U.S.C. § 252
(1988) and the case law because under the statute, identical reissue claims "shall
* constitute a continuation" of the original claims, and surrender of the original claims
upon reissuance of identical claims "shall not affect any action then pending nor abate
any cause of action then existing." Id at 637.
47. Ma
48. See 5 CHISUM, supra note 29, at n.105. Chisum states:
The patent owner may withdraw a charge of infringement or disavow any
intention of suing or threatening to sue. A number of decisions hold that such
action will not necessarily preclude the existence of an actual controversy,
especially ifthe disavowal occurs after the filing of the declaratory judgment
action.
Id § 21.021].




53. Id at 783.
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Second, apart from the threat of futuie litigation, the court found that allowing
unresolved charges of infringement would deprive Hadron of a market for its
products 6 Hadron's past customers would be discouraged and future customers
intimidated by the "litigious atmosphere" in which the product was offered for
sale 7
In Air-vend, Inc. v. Thorne Industries, Inc., the plaintiff brought a
declaratory judgment action against the assignee of a patent for a coin-operated
tire inflator s The defendant, Thome Industries (Thorne), initially
counterclaimed for infringement, but then dropped the claim and stipulated to the
court's dismissal of the infringement counterclaim with prejudice5 9 Thome then
moved to dismiss the action entirely, claiming that the court lacked jurisdiction
over the declaratory judgment because the dismissal of the counterclaim with
prejudice removed any apprehension on the part of Air-vend Incorporated (Air-
vend) that it might be sued for infringement.6"
The court found6' that a controversy remained despite the dismissal with
prejudice.62 The court discussed two reasons for the finding. First, the court
stated that it had complied with the requirements of Jervis B. Webb Co. v.
Southern Systems, Inc.I and Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co..e4
Those decisions indicated that the determination of whether a controversy exists
is not subject to a precise test.65 The court should examine the facts and
circumstances to determine whether there is a "substantial controversy, between
parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment."' The court did not elaborate




58. Air-vend, Inc. v. Thome Indus., Inc. 625 F. Supp. 1123, 1125 (D. Minn. 1985),
aff'd, 831 F.2d 306 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (unpublished opinion).
59. Id at 1126.
60. Id
61. The court denied the motion to dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction four months
before trial, then affirmed its own finding ofjurisdiction in the post-trial order. Id. at
1127.
62. Id
63. Jervis B. Webb Co. v. Southern Sys., Inc., 742 F.2d 1388, 1398 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
64. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270,273 (1941).
65. Air-vend, Inc. v. Thorne Indus., Inc. 625 F. Supp. 1123,1125 (D. Minn. 1985),
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The second ground for the court's finding is the more interesting of the two.
The court cited Sherwood Medical Industries, Inc. v. Deknatel, Inc.0 for the
proposition that a court in determining its own jurisdiction in declaratory
judgment actions may make "a pragmatic judgment in the light of defendants'
entire course of action and all of defendants' relevant conduct, and with the
awareness of the business realities that are involved."68 The facts, according to
the court, were that Thome had previously threatened Air-vend with a suit for
infringement of the patent, and had made good on the threat in the action before
the court.l Thome's threats and the subsequent action occurred around the same
time Thorne was marketing its tire inflator and emphasizing the patent covering
the inflator.70 Thus, Thorne was using the patent as leverage in the tire inflator
market.' Furthermore, Thome struck an agreement with Air-vend, embodied
in the stipulation, that all claims between the two were to be dropped except for
Air-vend's invalidity claim against the patent.72 According to the court, the
stipulation showed that Air-vend still feared the threat of patent infringement
suits in connection with tire inflators that it made but were not at issue in the
action or inflators it intended to produce or market." Therefore, the court found
that Air-vend had a reasonable apprehension that it would face an infringement
suit if it produced and marketed tire inflators, and, thus, an actual controversy
existed7
Furthermore, the court found the reality of the situation to support the
apprehension of Air-vend 5 Thome apparently was attempting to insulate the
patent from challenges by dismissing infringement charges, so that the validity
of the patent could never be adjudicated and the facially valid patent could be
used as a marketing device76 Finally, the court noted that not allowing Thome
to escape litigating the validity of the patent was in the public interest because
it would result in the removal of an invalid patent from the public domain and
67. Sherwood Med. Indus., Inc. v. Deknatel, Inc., 512 F.2d 724, 727 (8th Cir.
1975).





73. Air-vend, 625 F. Supp. at 1127-28.
74. Id. at 1128.
75. Id
76. Id See HARMON, supra note 5, § 8.1(a)(ii). Harmon states that "a patent
owner cannot unilaterally remove the validity issue if the accused infringer has
challenged the validity of the patent claim in a declaratory judgment counterclaim."
However, Harmon goes on to state that an actual controversy must exist at all stages of
review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed, citing Spectronics, among others.
19971
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would promote the inexpensive adjudication of a legal dispute without resort to
coercive remedies.7
The Air-vend court's findings were affirmed in an unpublished 2-1
decision? 8 The majority noted that, in effect Thorne was attempting to renege
on the agreement it had struck with Air-vend to drop most of the claims against
it save the invalidity claim against the patent 9 Though jurisdiction cannot be
conferred by agreement of the parties, the agreement did not establish that the
controversy between the parties had been resolved!' Judge Archer in dissent
would have found that no case or controversy existed after the dismissal with
prejudice.' He took issue specifically with the finding that Air-vend still feared
the threat of suit in connection with other tire inflators it was producing or
marketing, or intending to produce or market.8 There was no evidence of record
that Air-vend produced or marketed other tire inflators, and any plans to redesign
or market new inflators in the future were not sufficiently definite to satisfy the
requirements set forth in Jervis B. Webb, namely that the claimant must have
actually produced or prepared to produce such device 3
The Federal Circuit also affirmed jurisdiction where a patent owner stated
that it would not pursue a claim for infringement as to one of the patents in issue.
In Environmental Instruments, Inc. v. Sutron Corp.," Judge Rich wrote for a
three judge panel that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding
the validity of the patent where, on the eve of trial Environmental Instruments,
Incorporated (EII), the patent owner, announced it would not pursue its claim for
infringement.85 The court relied on a procedural error. EII did not move to
dismiss its claim for infingement, and, under FRCP 41(a)(2), a dismissal at that
point in the litigation would have required an order of the court." Therefore, the
77. Air-vend, 625 F. Supp. at 1128.
78. Air-vend, Inc. v. Thorne Indus., Inc., 831 F.2d 306 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(unpublished opinion) (for text of unpublished decision see Air-vend v. Thorne
Industries., Inc., No. 86-731, 1987 WL 44767 at *1 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 1987)).




82. Id at *2.
83. Id. (citing Jervis B. Webb Co. v. Southern Sys., Inc., 742 F.2d 1388, 1398
(Fed. Cir. 1984)).
84. Environmental Instruments, Inc. v. Sutron Corp., 877 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir.
1989).
85. Id at 1566.
86. Id. Note that under Rule 41(a)(2), if a counterclaim has been pleaded by a
defendant before the plaintiff's motion to dismiss has been served, the action shall not
be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim remains pending
for independent adjudication by the court. Early courts seemed to rely on this rule in
[Vol. 62
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infringement claim remained in the case, and there remained a continuing actual
controversy as to both validity and infringement of the patent s7
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the court first noted that according to the declaratory
judgment statute,"8 a declaratory judgment counterclaim may be brought to
resolve an "actual controversy" between "interested" parties. 9 However, there
must be a "sufficiently concrete dispute" to continue the actionl so that the
"actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time
the complaint is filed."' Furthermore, the court found the burden to be on Chase
"to establish that jurisdiction over its declaratory jugment action existed at, and
ha[d] continued since, the time the [counterclaim] was filed."92
The court noted that Chase had to establish an actual controversy on the
"totality of the circumstances," and that in declaratory judgment actions
involving patent rights, a two part test is used to determine justiciability.93 The
two part test is as follows:
order to find that despite the patent owner's unwillingness to prosecute its infringement
case, the alleged infringer could proceed to litigate validity if the alleged infringer had
previously counterclaimed for invalidity. See 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2365 n.2 (2d ed. 1994). An exemplary case held that "in the case of
a patent, which is a claim of monopoly hanging over a trade, the plaintiff can[not]
suddenly, at the last moment, withdraw his claim of infringent and then claim, as the
plaintiff's counsel now seeks to do, that the question of validity has become moot."
Knaust Bros., Inc. v. Goldschlag, 28 F. Supp. 188, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
However, more recent cases correctly find this reasoning unpersuasive and contrary
to the intent of the FRCP. In Gutierrez, in the context of a collapsed savings and loan,
the court found Rule 41(aX2) was intended to apply where the plaintiff seeks to dismiss
voluntarily. Gutierrez v. Champion Say. Ass'n, 727 F. Supp. 1088, 1089 (S.D. Tex.
1989). In that case, the court noted that a dismissal with prejudice was a complete
adjudication of the issues presented and was a complete bar to any further actions
between the parties on those issues. Id Thus, it was inconceivable to the court that the
rule should require a plaintiff to maintain a cause which he is willing to abandon
permanently, regardless of a pending counterclaim. Id at 1090.
87. Id
88. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1994).
89. 57 F.3d 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 815 (1996).
90. Id. (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 23941 (1937);
Spectronics Corp. v. H.B. Fuller Co., 940 F.2d 631,633-34 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
91. Id (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395,401 (1975)).
92. Id (quoting International Med. Prosthetics Research Assocs. v. Gore Enter.
Holdings, Inc., 787 F.2d 572, 575 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).




Munsell: Munsell: Declaratory Judgment Act's Actual Controversy Requirement:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
MISSOURILAWREVIEW
There must be both (1) an explicit threat or other action 6y the patent owner,
which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratory
plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit, and (2) present activity which
could constitute infringement or concrete steps taken with the intent to
conduct such activity.'
The purpose of the test is to determine whether there is a "real and
immediate" need for adjudication or whether the need is "prospective and
uncertain of occurrence.' 95 The court noted that while there are few generally
applicable rules for determining whether there is an actual controversy, there are
cases marking the extremes. On one extreme, a party fearing potential
infringement liability need not be actually threatened with an infringement suit
before she may bring a justiciable declaratory judgment action.' On the
opposite extreme, the court cited Spectronics for the idea that:
[A] patent owner defending against an action for a declaratory judgment of
invalidity can divest the trial court ofjurisdiction over the case by filing a
covenant not to assert the patent at issue against the putative infringer with
respect to any of its past, present or future acts, even when a reissue
application covering the same claimed subject matter is then pending. 7
Having given the justiciability outline, the court then considered Chase's claims
of error.
Chase first argued that, because the form of Super Sack's promise not to
assert the patents was not in the form of a binding covenant, the promise was
incapable of depriving the court ofjurisdiction.98 Chase claimed that because the
promise was merely an argument or offer by Super Sack's counsel, Super Sack
might later deny that its counsel had authority to make the promise.9
94. Id (quoting BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed.
Cir. 1993)).
95. Super Sack, 57 F.3d at 1058 (quoting BP Chemicals, 4 F.3d at 978).
96. Id (citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber v. Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d 953, 955-56
(Fed. Cir. 1987)).
97. Id (citing Spectronics, 940 F.2d at 636-38).
98. Id at 1059.
99. Id This argument seems reminiscent ofthe court's finding in C.R Bard, Inc.
v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874 (Fed. Cir. 1983). There the court found that an affidavit filed
by the patent owner failed to remove any apprehension of infringement suit because it
said only that the patent owner "had no intention of... suing for infringement." Id at.
881. Intentions, the court said, may change over time, so the patent owner must state that
it would definitely not bring an infringement suit. Id Furthermore, at oral argument, the
patent owner's attorney would not affirmatively state that he would not bring suit, only
that on the facts presently known to him he would not sue. Id
[Vol. 62
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The court rejected this argument, finding that Super Sack would be
estopped by agency principles to argue that its counsel acted ultra vires.14 The
court found that the heart of the matter was the legal effect of Super Sack's
promise not to sue.' Although Chase might have some cause to fear an
infringement suit under the same patents for products it develops in the future,
it could suffer no liability for products it made, sold, or used before Super Sack
filed its motion to dismiss."°  Because Chase could have no reasonable
apprehension of suit, the court found that Chase failed the first part of the
justiciability test.'03 As Super Sack was estopped from suit, there was no
controversy "sufficiently actual" to confer jurisdiction over the case.' u
Chase also claimed that the promise failed to eliminate the possibility of suit
for products Chase might make, sell, or use in the future.' The court relied
upon several cases for the proposition that the second part of the test of
justiciability required that Chase's "present activity" place it at risk of
infringement liability."° Chase made no claim that it even had taken meaningful
preparatory steps toward an activity that might later be said to infringe. 7 The
court thus found that because of Super Sack's promise, any past or present
activities of Chase were irrelevant to whether ajusticiable controversy existed. 08
Furthermore, the "residual possibility" of a future suit by Super Sack based on
Chase's future acts was simply "too speculative a basis for jurisdiction" over the
counterclaim seeking the declaration of invalidity of the patents-in-suit)' Thus,
according to the court, "[t]he only proper course for the trial court was to dismiss
the case for lack ofjurisdiction, as it did."'"
100. Id (citing Linkv. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962) (petitioner
voluntarily chose his attorney as his representative in the action and is bound under the
system of representative litigation by the acts of his lawyer-agent)).





106. Id (citing BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir.
1993); Spectronics v. H.B. Fuller Co., 940 F.2d 631, 634 ("accused infringer must have
actually produced or prepared to produce an allegedly infringing product"); Arrowhead
Indus., v. First Data Resources, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (accused
infringer "[mJust be engaged in an actual making, selling or using activity subject to an
infringement charge or must have made meaningful preparation for such activity")).
107. Super Sack, 57 F.3d at 1059-60.
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Chase's last argument hung on the decision in Cardinal Chemical Co. v.
Morton International, Inc.,'" which, according to Chase, "clearly upheld the
separate viability of an invalidity counterclaim."' 12 The court found that Chase
took words from Cardinal out of context."' The question before the Cardinal
court was actually "whether the affirmance by the [Federal Circuit] of a finding
that a patent has not been infringed is a sufficient reason," by itself, to vacate a
declaratoryjudgment of invalidity. While Cardinal answered the question in the
negative, the court found the holding to be a narrow one. The court summarized
the decision:
(A] claim for a declaratoryjudgment of invalidity is independent of the patent
owner's charge of infringement in the following-and only the
following-way: an affirmed finding ofnoninfringement does not, without
morejustify a reviewing court's refusal to reach the trial court's conclusion
on invalidity."'
The court distinguished the posture of the present case from that of
Cardinal. While Cardinal addressed the propriety of appellate jurisdiction over
final judgments respecting infringement and validity, the trial court in the present
case never made a finding on infringement or on validity." s Thus, contrary to
Chase's arguments, the court found that Cardinal did not "revolutionize" the
justiciability determination in declaratory judgment actions." 6 Because Chase
failed to carry its burden of showing justiciability, the case was properly
dismissed." 7
111. 508 U.S. 83 (1993).
112. Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054 (Fed. Cir.
1995), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 815 (1996).
113. Id. Chase relied on the statement in Cardinal that "[a] party seeking a
declaratory judgment of invalidity presents a claim independent of the patent owner's











The rule established by the Super Sack court seems clear and easy to apply.
If a patent owner agrees to abandon any infringement claims against the putative
infringers, the patent owner may divest the court ofjurisdiction. Thus, he may
remove his patent from litigation and avoid the risk that the patent will be
declared invalid. The cost to the patent owner is that he may never again bring
an infringement claim against the putative infringer for products the putative
infringer presently makes, sells, or uses or has prepared to make, sell, or use.'18
While the result is reasonable under the rules ofjusticiability, the court neglected
to harmonize its holding with prior decisions finding that, in special
circumstances, a patent owner may not unilaterally remove his patent from issue.
The court failed to acknowledge the tension between the Spectronics
holding and many other decisions wherein courts retained jurisdiction and
adjudicated the validity of the patent where it had been used improperly to chill
the market, thus gaining an improper advantage for the patent owner." 9 The
court failed to acknowledge the Federal Circuit's own unpublished affirmance
of the decision in Air-vend, which did not have precedential effect, but
nonetheless was in direct conflict with the rule in the instant decision. In failing
to acknowledge conflicting precedent, the court missed an opportunity to discuss
the policy behind the rule and whether exceptions should exist.
Admittedly, the court's rule makes sense under most circumstances. Most
patent owners will not lightly bring infringement actions, and if they decide that
further litigation would be fruitless, they should not be forced to continue an
action they no longer are willing to prosecute.1 2' Additionally, the court's rule
comports with the justiciability rules for declaratory judgments. There must
exist a present, actual controversy, something more than "a residual possibility
of future infringement."' 2'
However, one of the policies served by the Declaratory Judgment Act is to
allow a test of the validity of patents that might be being used as what Judge
Learned Hand termed "scarecrows."'" While there can be no "policy"
118. See supra text accompanying notes 102-03.
119. See supra discussion at Section 111.
120. Obviously, the putative infringer in the action may extract a price for her time
and money spent, either in the form of costs oflitigation or the promise not to sue in the
future or both. See Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d
1394 (D.C. Tex.) (discussing costs allowed in the instant case), afid, 57 F.3d 1054 (Fed.
Cir. 1995), cer denied, 116 S. Ct. 815 (1996).
121. Super Sack, 57 F.3d at 1060.
122. HARMON, supra note 5, at 290 (citing Bresnick v. United States Vitamin
Corp., 139 F.2d 239,242 (2d Cir. 1943)).
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exceptions to constitutional requirements of justiciability, the constitutional
framework on justiciability under the Declaratory Judgment Act is broader than
the court recognized. Judge Markey of the Federal Circuit recognized the
general problem in Arrowhead:
This appeal presents a type of the sad and saddening scenario that led to
enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act... [A] patent owner engages in
a danse macabre, brandishing a Damoclean threat with a sheathed sword..
.. Guerrilla-like, the patent owner attempts extra-judicial patent enforcement
with scare-the-customer-and-run tactics that infect the competitive
environment of the business community with uncertainty and insecurity...
. Before the Act, competitors victimized by that tactic were rendered helpless
and immobile so long as the patent owner refused to grasp the nettle and sue.
After the Act, those competitors were no longer restricted to an in terrorem
choice between the incurrence of a growing potential liability for patent
infiingement and abandonment oftheir enterprises; they could clear the air by
suing for a judgment that would settle the conflict of interests. The sole
requirement for jurisdiction under the Act is that the conflict be real and
immediate, i.e., that there be a true, actual "controversy" required by the
Act.12
With Judge Markey's explanation in mind, the seemingly unequivocal rule
set down by the instant decision seems to sweep too broadly. While the court
characterized the "residual possibility of future infringement suit" as "too
speculative a basis for jurisdiction,"'' 4 other courts, including a panel of the
Federal Circuit, have disagreed." The oft-repeated rule is that there need not
be an express threat of litigation. Suits in which courts retained jurisdiction
usually involved bad faith patent owners who used patents as weapons to
intimidate legitimate competitors. Those courts found jurisdiction based on the
reasonable apprehension of the competitor from the patent owner's entire course
of conduct. 125
The court's statement of facts mentions that Super Sack asserted the same
patents against another party, with the trial court finding no infringement, but the
patents to be valid./z7 The decision does not discuss the competitive atmosphere
123. Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731,734-35 (Fed.
Cir. 1988).
124. Super Sack, 57 F.3d at 1060.
125. See discussion ofAir-vendand other cases in Section III above.
126. Air-vend, Inc. v. Thorne Indus., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 1123, 1127-28 (D. Minn
1985), a.f'd, 831 F.2d 306 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (unpublished opinion); See supra discussion
at Section III.
127. Super Sack, 57 F.3d at 1056. Note that the prior finding that the patent was
not invalid does not bar an alleged infringer like Chase from challenging validity if he
were not a party in the prior adjudication. HARMoN, supra note 5, at 771. The Blonder-
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surrounding the product, nor whether that atmosphere could be relevant. In most
of the prior decisions, an issue was whether the existence of the patent, untested
by a court in a validity action, was in effect spoiling the market for the alleged
infringer. That issue was not raised in the instant decision. While that may not
have been an issue for Super Sack vis-a-vis Chase, the court's unequivocal rule
seems to foreclose a later court from retaining jurisdiction where a patent owner
is using what Judge Markey terms "scare-the-customer-and-run tactics." In
those cases, it would serve the public interest to thwart a patent owner who
repeatedly attempts to escape litigation, because it may result in the removal of
an invalid patent from the public domain and save a later court from relitigating
the patent's validity.' Otherwise, a flimsy patent may be used to infect the
competitive environment with uncertainty and insecurity while escaping judicial
review of its validity.
The court also failed to discuss whether Chase's customers were protected
under the promise not to sue.1' Presumably, the doctrine of Kessler v. Eldred3
would apply. The Kessler doctrine bars an infringement suit against a customer
or seller who has previously prevailed against the patent owner because of
invalidity or noninfringement.'3 ' On remand, the district court found that
because a dismissal with prejudice is deemed an adjudication on the merits for
the purposes of res judicata, Chase was the prevailing party for purposes of
taxing costs. 32 Therefore, Chase is likely a prevailing party for purposes of the
Kessler doctrine as well. Its customers likewise are not liable under the patents,
but the court failed to state it explicitly. The court could have alleviated the
problem by requiring Super Sack to promise that it would not sue any of Chase's
customers. .This addition to the promise made by a patent owner might also
serve to alleviate one of the concerns of the putative infringer. That concern is
that although the putative infringer will not be held liable, the market for its
products will be negatively affected by threats of infringement claims against its
customers.
Tongue doctrine does, however, allow a prior determination of patent invalidity to be
asserted as a defense, unless the patent owner can argue it was denied a full and fair
opportunity to litigate in the prior action. Id
128. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
129. The court stated: "Super Sack is forever estopped by its counsel's statement
of nonliability, on its face and as explained during oral argument before this court, from
asserting liability against Chase in connection with any products that Chase made, sold,
or used on or before July 8, 1994." Super Sack, 57 F.3d at 1056.
130. 206 U.S. 285 (1907).
131. HARMON, supra note 5, at 773.
132. Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1394 (D.C.
Tex.) (discussing costs allowed in the instant case), af'd, 57 F.3d 1054 (Fed. Cir.1995),
cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 815 (1996).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Super Sack decision likely is correct on the facts, but the rule it states
may prove a problem for future patent litigation. The rule is effective for the
majority of cases where a patent owner suing an alleged infringer does so for
good reason. Such patent owner should not be forced to defend the validity of
his patent where he is willing permanently to release the accused infringer from
liability. However, the court failed to account for the rare cases where a patent
owner abuses the rights granted under the patent and uses the patent to intimidate
competitors with the threat of litigation. The hard and fast rule that the court
adopts, allowing patent owners willing to dismiss with prejudice to deny a court
ofjurisdiction over declaratory judgment claims, needs to be tempered so that
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